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STATE CAPTURE: IS IT A CRIME?
HOW THE WORLD PERCEIVED IT
Lily Evelina Sitorus
Abstract
State capture has emerged as a global threat in several countries. The
definitions vary from the act of rent-seeking to corruption. Russia, Ukraine,
and some countries in Central Asia are several areas  where state capture
was first observed. Indonesia is not immune from the threat. Several
misconducts in the country had already been labeled as state capture.
There are some distinctions between state capture and corruption,
whereas in a few countries both are considered as the same. Strategies
for combating corruption usually involve reducing state capture.

Introduction

In common understanding, corruption is often referred to either as bribery
practice or as major embezzlement/plundering of public monies. There is also a
third form of corruption, less known but still very pervasive, found often but not
exclusively in transition countries: state capture.
State capture has evolved from being contested as the lead factor in
corruption in the Former Soviet Union in its early days of the discussion, to
increasingly being re-examined with more scepticism as to its actual prevalence
and its status as the leading type of corruption in the region.
1. Definitions

When we think about corruption, an image quickly comes to mind
a bureaucrat extorting bribes from powerless individuals and defenceless
firms simply to enable them to “get things done.” Behind this view lies an
understanding of the state extracting rents from the economy for the exclusive
benefit of politicians and bureaucrats.
Joel Hellman and Daniel Kaufmann (2001) said that in transition
economies, corruption has taken on a new image—that of so-called oligarchs
manipulating policy formation and even shaping the emerging rules of the game
to their own very substantial advantage. They refer to this behaviour as state
capture.  
‘State capture’ was also defined by Vesna Pesic (2007) as any group
or social strata, external to the state, that seizes decisive influence over state
institutions and policies for its own interests and against the public good.
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Teten Masduki, one of the major players for combating corruption in Indonesia
also has a similar view that state capture is a policy  made to the advantage of
entrepreneurs.  
Anne Lugon-Moulin (2010) in understanding state capture said that it
occurs when the ruling elite and/or powerful businessmen manipulate policy
formation and influence the emerging rules of the game (including laws and
economic regulations) to their own advantage.  
In recognising the problem of state capture, Helmann and Kaufmann put
their effort on the complex interactions between firms and the state. Particularly,
they emphasized the importance of mechanisms through which firms seek to
shape decisions taken by the state to gain specific advantages, often through the
imposition of anticompetitive barriers that generate highly concentrated gains to
selected powerful firms at a significant social cost. Because such firms use their
influence to block any policy reforms that might eliminate these advantages,
state capture has become not merely a symptom but also a fundamental cause
of poor governance.
The dangers to the long-term development of such a capture economy
are self-evident. New, dynamic entrepreneurs have strong incentives to invest
their talents in capturing the state rather than in developing innovative
products or production methods, in order to compete successfully in a distorted
environment.
In a way, Helmann and Kaufmann said that the capture economy rewards
connections over competence and influence over innovation; it is fuelled
by private investments in politics that weaken the state and undermine the
provision of basic public goods. At the same time, they also find that capture
economy systematically deters private economic investments, both foreign
and domestic, and creates obstacles to the entry of small- and medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs), undermining the key sources of sustainable growth.
In the absence of access to government decision making through collective
representatives, firms are compelled to seek informal, one-on-one relationships
with individual state officials to represent their interests. A number of key
writings on the topic suggest the roots of state capture extend from partial civil
liberties, lack of transparency, competition, and insecurity of property rights.
The lack of transparency tends to go hand in hand with insufficient competition
among firms and other constituencies to influence the state’s deliberative
processes. Fostering competition in the economy and in the marketplace for
political influence is the main challenge in preventing and combating state
capture.
2. Modes

There are several modes of state capture present in every country. Even
the definitions vary. The common understanding is that state capture and legal
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corruption are one and the same. While most types of corruption are directed
toward changing how existing laws, rules, or regulations are implemented with
respect to the bribe payer, state capture refers to corrupt efforts to influence
how those laws, rules, and regulations are formed.

The high-capture group includes countries regarded as partial reformers
in both political and economic terms. Although they have made progress in
liberalisation and privatisation, they have been much slower to enact the
complementary institutional reforms to support the emergence of markets.
State capture can be distinguished between types of institutions subject
to capture (Legislative, Executive, Judiciary, regulatory agencies, or public works
ministries) and the types of actors actively seeking to capture (large private
firms, political leaders, high ranking officials, or interest groups).10
Concentration of both economic and political power is also likely to lead to
serious state capture, which usually goes hand in hand with a weak civil society,
according to Helmann and Kaufmann. Bribes to parliamentarians to “buy”
their votes on important pieces of legislation, bribes to government officials to
enact favourable regulations or decrees, and bribes to judges to influence court
decisions—these are the classic examples of grand corruption through which
firms can encode advantages for themselves into the basic legal and regulatory
structure of the economy.
In most transition economies, the mechanisms through which the state
deliberates on the formation of laws, rules, and decrees are still largely hidden
from public view. The use of public hearings and the Internet to provide a
transparent forum for open decision making is rare. Draft laws are seldom
published for discussion. Transcripts of deliberations are not available for public
perusal. The voting records of individual legislators are not made available to
the public.


Ibid.
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At the same time, the institutional tools that various constituencies can
use to gain access to the state’s deliberations are very limited. Political parties
are weak. Trade associations, interest groups, and collective organisations lack
the resources and experience to influence policy.11
Due to the fact, Helmann and Kaufmann saw few transition countries have
sufficient safeguards to ensure proper disclosure of efforts to influence public
officials, creating an environment highly susceptible to capture. Firms have little
incentive to report their political contributions, and public officials face few or
no real sanctions for accepting such contributions.
In that matter, periodic public declarations of assets and income sources
by government officials (and at times by their dependents) are now required
in many transition countries, but the relevant implementation mechanisms
remain quite weak. Conflict-of-interest rules are poorly understood and barely
enforced. Public interest watchdog groups have little capacity to monitor the
flow of funds from firms to politicians.
Case to the point in Indonesia, even if the Ministry of Communication and
Information had already released the proper legislation for public transparency,12  
the implementation of it is hard to reach. When the mark up of police account
happens, the party concerned based in this law asks for police transparency but
it is usually rejected.13
Helmann and Kaufmann research found that in the capture economy,
political influence is monopolised by powerful firms at different levels of
government, with minimal checks and balances exerted by collective interests.
In several transition countries, the monopolisation of political channels of
influence reflects the underlying structure of the economy—in particular where
the high concentration of natural resources in national output creates a highly
unequal distribution of power across different firms and different sectors.
In
other
countries,
such monopolisation reflects
continued restrictions on the
extent of political competition.
The state-capture index is
systematically lower in countries
that
have
pursued
more
comprehensive economic reform.
Furthermore, at any given pace
of economic reform, there is a
dramatic decline in state capture
in countries with higher levels of
civil liberties. Yet, it is clear that
the causal links between capture
and reform run in both directions,
which makes breaking out of the
vicious circle so difficult.14
Hellman and Kaufmann. Loc. Cit.
UU No 14 Tahun 2008 (Law Number 14 Year 2008).
13
ICW Ajukan Sengketa Informasi soal Rekening Gendut Pati Polri (ICW asked for police account
transparency)
from
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Anne Lugon-Moulin presented as example how captor firms can receive
extra advantages not only in the form of sales increases, but also in the provision
of public goods, such as property rights, by purchasing individualised protection
of their property rights from the state.15
However, that comes at a significant social cost: if politicians and
bureaucrats can minimise their political risks by selling privately such public
goods to a few individual firms in exchange of economic revenues, they have
little incentive to provide the public at large with open access to these goods.
Therefore, the level of insecurity of property rights is much higher for the
average firm and the ordinary citizen. Specific examples are state-owned
enterprises sold at low prices to politicians and new laws designed in a way of
favouring specific economic actors in a given sector at the expense of free and
fair competition for all.16
Practices

The practices of state capture had invoked the party involved to find the
solutions. Kaufmann is one of the leading researchers in these matters. His
research basically made the basic ground for other researches to be held. World
Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)
conducted joint initiative to form The Business Environment and Enterprise
Performance Survey (BEEPS).17
The results of the survey in 2002 showed that there has been a decline in state
capture--significant in some cases--across the transition countries. The countries
where capture was most pronounced--Russia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova-have seen the sharpest decline, while countries with more modest capture levels,
for example in some south-eastern European countries, have remained more or
less constant or have experienced an increase in levels of capture.18
1. Russia19

Practitioners in Russia consistently highlight  two parallel processes taking
place in the country: state capture and business capture (the latter being used
to describe the state unlawfully taking control and exercising undue influence
over businesses); or even, as described by some, these two processes have been
turned into the fusion of state + business by the elite, with former bureaucrats
running businesses and business leaders holding or controlling political office.
Amongst the key measures to address the situation are the introduction of
conflict of interest regulations, codes of conduct, and wide-ranging transparency
reforms. In addition, it has now been acknowledged by many that to galvanise
Russia’s public debate over corruption, it is vital to remove the sole responsibility
for reform from the government. By focusing on the supply-side, debate can
lead to more direct, immediate and measurable action, particularly in areas like
state capture. Thus, the importance of engaging the business community in the
process is being increasingly highlighted.
Anne Lugon-Moulin. Loc. Cit.
Ibid.
17
http://www.ebrd.com/pages/research/analysis/surveys/beeps.shtml
18
Donals Bowser.   Addressing State Capture in Russia/Ukraine/Central Asia. Anti-Corruption
Resource Center from http://www.u4.no/helpdesk/helpdesk/queries/query18.cfm
19
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a. Engaging The Business Community: Collective Action, Business Self-Regulation,
Etc.
Earlier this year, Russian President Vladimir Putin publicly challenged
the leaders of the Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (RSPP) to help
“destroy the breeding ground for corruption.” RSPP is a business association
that includes the financial-industrial groups that secured control of a majority
of the country’s wealth during the past decade of privatisation. The association
responded by creating a working group that will recommend administrative
reform measures to the president, which will include reducing obstacles to any
business that provides the opportunity and incentive to engage in various forms
of corruption, including state capture.
Notwithstanding the fact that civil servants play a role in both state
and business capture, the breeding ground can be attacked only if private
sector leaders take initiative. There are numerous market incentives for RSPP
and other business leaders to adopt anti-corruption practices. Those include
enhancing reputation and good will as business assets, reducing the risk and
costs associated with capture, strengthening competitive position, increasing
shareholder value, and gaining access to capital and credit on better terms. In
the long-term, RSPP requires institutions that can govern a market economy
built on true competition. To meet Putin’s challenge, RSPP should take concrete
initiatives that can be implemented largely by the supply side. In particular,
RSPP members should form “integrity pacts” with other large businesses, SMEs,
and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) at the national and regional levels
designed to institute conditions for transparent and fair business competition.
The most concrete form of an integrity pact is a “no-bribery pledge,” under
which companies entering a government tender or privatisation bid and the
officials responsible for choosing the winner commit to a transparent procedure.
In particular, they pledge not to offer, pay, accept, or seek bribes of any kind
during the tender. To show their good faith, they may place funds in escrow that
they would relinquish if they did engage in bribery. If a business does not abide
by the guidelines, it will lose the bid and other participants in the pledge can
stop doing business with (or blacklist) it. Such pacts have been implemented to
one degree or another throughout the world. To maximise impact on economic
growth, RSPP should form integrity pacts that help both large enterprises and
SMEs.
RSPP leaders should also take initiative in regions where they operate
their factories and other outlets. They are in the best position to help institute
local programmes to monitor government agencies and budget processes,
increase access to information regarding allocation of public resources, and
foster independent oversight of public procurement. These are best done
through joint coalitions with NGOs and watchdogs.
RSPP is not the only institution engaging in the process of private sectordriven initiatives to address corruption and state capture. Disproportionately
injured by the extortion practices of officials at all levels, SMEs are already taking
local initiatives throughout Russia. Another example of a private sector initiative
is the formation---by a highly regarded economics professor, Lev Kaplan, and
the General Director of the U.S. subsidiary of Otis Elevator, Vladimir Marov--of
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an “Honest Builders’ Club.” The coalition dedicated to fair business practices
now includes 30 of the largest local construction companies, various NGOs, and
the city’s Vice-Governor for Construction.
The Association of Minority Shareholders’ Rights assisted the Kremlin’s
efforts to expose shady financial deals at Gazprom, 38 percent of which is owned
by the state. Minority shareholders claimed that the theft of vast amounts of cash
had kept share prices low and reduced profits. In December 2001, Gazprom’s
new management decided to reclaim the Purgaz gas field, a valuable asset that
was previously ‘pawned.’ Since the new management arrived, Gazprom shares
have risen 44 percent.
The Corporate Behavioural Code is one example of Russia’s determination
to improve corporate governance and the investment climate. More than 150
Russian companies were consulted in the course of developing the code. It
includes amendments to the joint stock company law, securities market law, the
criminal law, and provisions of criminal liability in cases of non-disclosure, as
well as measures for enforcement. While some are skeptical as to the genuine
intentions, it is widely expected to seal major loopholes in existing corporate
governance structures.
b. Transparency Measures20
Among recent concrete measures and/or developments aimed at
improving transparency are:

On elections, Party Finance, and Lobbying Regulations
Russia passed a law on the election of deputies to the State Duma in
November 2002. While the basic provisions of the law remain the same as in the
1999 version, it contains some new provisions concerned with finance, namely
the introduction of spending caps, stricter regulation of funding sources, and
size of acceptable donations. A law on the presidential election was passed
in December 2002 with the intention to streamline a hitherto complicated
process.
Party financing and regulations remain as major issues for Russia in the
context of state capture. Informal political actors--financial groups and political
“oligarchs”--dominate the political spectrum. Political parties are included into
the structure of an “oligarchy” to act as legitimate vehicle for engagement in
public policy and lobbying. They are supported by their own controlled mass
media and key industries.
On access to Information
Russia’s federal access to information law has not yet passed the stage of
parliamentary debate and is under review by the Duma since 1996. Some regions
and local entities (including Kaliningrad, Greater Novgorod) have, however,
engaged in reform with the goal of making information held by government
bodies available to the general public. Generally speaking, access to information
is not considered a great priority by politicians and the civil society alike in a
context in which the state is still largely perceived to be a ruler, rather than a
provider of public services.
20

Ibid.
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2. Ukraine
In Ukraine, the dominant motive appears to be revenge against the
oligarchs who supported the old regime. Big businessmen identified with the
new regime may also have their own motives  in seizing the assets of the old
oligarchs. Again, a third goal is to level the playing field. Clearly, the two first
objectives contradict the third one, which is the legitimate goal. One idea is that
the privatisation will be annulled, compensation will be paid to the prior owner
for his initial payment, and then the enterprise will be sold anew by the state at
a competitive auction. The redistribution of property is often considered as one
of the characteristics of a revolution.21

On elections, Party Finance, and Lobbying Regulations22
Ukraine has adopted a number of laws to regulate this area, among them
the 2001 Law on Political Parties, the 1999 Presidential Election Law, and the
2001 Parliamentary Election Law. The latter is considered to be an improvement
compared to the previous (1998/94) legislations.
Ukraine has introduced some specific measures on public disclosure of
political finances, such as for example, the information on the size and sources
of contributions to the funds of candidates, as well as publication of financial
statements indicating the use of those funds.   The CEC (the central electoral
body) has to publish the information in two national newspapers within seven
days prior to the  elections.
One of the most severe problems in the area of elections, campaign
financing, and regulation that has direct impact on the dynamics of state capture
is still  the issue of funding sources for political parties. Ukrainian fragmented
and non-institutionalised party system keeps encouraging big businesses to
form client circles and run their own parties to directly control decision-making
processes.
In terms of Civil Society-led concrete initiatives in this area, Transparency
International (TI) national chapter (and “Freedom of Choice Coalition”)
had implemented a project on Public Monitoring of Parliamentary Electoral
Campaign Financing in 2002.
3. Central Asia23

State capture does not necessarily remain stable over time. In many
instances, efforts were focused at constructing well-functioning states early in
the transition period only to be  swamped in the second half of the decade. For
some countries, it is a question of whether they will progress or regress in the
transition to democracy and to a market economy. In Central Asia, Kazakhstan
is one of the examples.
On elections, Party Finance, and Lobbying Regulations
Kazakhstan adopted a Law on Political Parties on 26 June 2002. It
introduced fundamental changes to the financial activities of political parties,

21
Anders Aslund (2005). Comparative Oligarchy: Russia, Ukraine and the United States. Center
for Social and Economic Research from http://www.case.com.pl/upload/publikacja_plik/4931074_
SA%20296last.pdf
22
Bowser. Loc. Cit.
23
Ibid.
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including their sources of funding. Potential transparency and accountability
gains are, however, contravened by the inclusion of clauses in the law that in
turn directly affects the formation and operation of political parties, e.g. the
requirement of a minimum 50,000-membership for a party to register and the
introduction of mechanisms designed to enable the state to interfere in the
internal affairs of political parties.

On Access to Information
In Kazakhstan, the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan (adopted in
1995) guarantees access to information as a constitutional right: Everyone shall
have the right to freely receive and disseminate information by any means not
prohibited by law. The list of items constituting state secrets of the Republic of
Kazakhstan shall be determined by the law. The subsequent law, however, “on
protection of state secrets of the Republic of Kazakhstan,” which “determines
legal principles and the single system of protection of state secrets in all types of
activity of state executive and management agencies, enterprises, institutions,
associations, and organisations, irrespective of the form of property, as well as
of military units and citizens of the Republic of Kazakhstan on the territory of
the state and outside of it,” is rather extensive.
The Kyrgyz Republic adopted a Law on the Fight against Corruption on 6
March 2003. Other than establishing the legal and organisational foundations for
the fight against corruption in Kyrgyzstan, the law explicitly mentions the role
of the media in investigating corruption offences and disseminating information
regarding the latter. It also establishes provisions for government agencies to
publicise information relating to internal corruption matters.

On Conflicts of Interest and Disclosure
The term “conflicts of interest” did for the first time become a provision
of Kazakhstan’s law on control over execution of national and local budgets
enacted in 2002. It is provided for as  any activity of relations which is capable
of limiting the objectivity and the independence of the state body employees in
terms of either internal or external control.
A Kazakh governmental decree of 2000 establishes that all civil servants
within a month of assuming office are obliged for the duration of their public
service to transfer to confidential management any shares of participation in
authorised capital of commercial organisations and other conflicting property
and assets. Kyrgyzstan does not have any specific conflict of interest legislation,
but interestingly it is regulated as an aspect of corruption by the standards of
the Criminal Code.
Finally, an interesting governmental body is under discussion for
establishment in Kyrgyzstan-the National Council on Faithful Management. Its
main tasks are inter alia to include taking steps to eliminate the unwarranted and
needless interference of the state structures into the economy and commercial
entities.
State Capture in Indonesia

Taking the role as Putin already had is Indonesian President Susilo
Bambang Yudhoyono. When elected as the sixth president of the country, he
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introduced the integrity pact for his cabinet. Candidates for any ministry office
must sign their   commitment to avoid corruption according to the code of
conduct.24 This action might relate to the history of Indonesia under the Suharto
regime.
The Suharto government may have never intended to give grief to
Indonesia, but alas after ruling for almost 32 years, it had established itself as
a corrupt regime. After that, Indonesia forced to embark on a comprehensive
and unprecedented process of decentralisation, devolving--almost overnight-enormous responsibilities to regional, provincial, and local governments. In spite
of considerable achievements, the Indonesian decentralisation process continues
to face major challenges of state capture by the local elites, a deeply entrenched
patronage system, and widespread petty and bureaucratic corruption.
The greater the achievement, the greater the risk involved. The
emergence of stronger civil society and a free media constitute promising
trends that combined with further reforms aimed at promoting transparency
and community participation, as well as reinforcing upward and downward
accountability mechanisms. It could ensure that decentralisation fully yields the
intended benefits.
TI in accordance with Anti Corruption Resource Centre25 tries to fully
understand the nature of corruption challenges at the local level. In query, they
said that it is important to analyse the successes and failures of Indonesia’ s
unprecedented decentralisation process, that transferred rapidly complete
responsibility for most public services to the sub national level. The fast transition
from a highly centralised to a largely decentralised system has created specific
accountability challenges that significantly affect corruption risks at the local
level.
1. Definitions

Todung Mulya Lubis (2009), senior advocate practising in Indonesia, said
that Lapindo’s mud case in Sidoarjo is an example of state capture corruption.
An activist for Transparency International Indonesia (TII), Lubis surely
knows enough about corruption practices. He said that the Lapindo case is a
manifestation of state capture corruption.
Furthermore, in media26 he explained that state capture corruption
happens if there are some parties that may gain benefits from government
policy. Indication to the fact can be seen in this case when the party involved
never took the responsibility for the disaster. The policy endorsed by Indonesian
government to take responsibility for Lapindo mud flow victims has illustrated
how businesses may shift a policy against public interests.
What makes state capture possible according to David Kupferschmidt
(2010) from International IDEA is the existence of a well-organised and a
well-funded interest; in the case of Indonesia, the powerful business groups.
Their control of large media groups, combined with weak law enforcement,
24
Calon Menteri harus tanda tangani komitmen anti-korupsi (2009). Antaranews.com from http://
www.antaranews.com/berita/1255836656/calon-menteri-tanda-tangan-anti-korupsi
25
Marie Chene (2009). Corruption Challenges at Sub-National Level in Indonesia. Anti-Corruption
Resources Center from http://www.u4.no/helpdesk/helpdesk/query.cfm?id=210
26
Todung: Kasus Lapindo adalah “state capture corruption (2009). Antaranews.com from http://
www.antaranews.com/berita/1251382626/todung-kasus-lapindo-adalah-state-capture-corruption
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contributes to establishment of a conducive environment to state capture.27
State capture can be described as “investment” in political parties
through political financing or bribery in law enforcement agencies, combined
with the utilisation of mass media to influence public opinion and policy making.
It allows powerful interest groups to use their abundant financial resources to
halt the opportunities for gaining economic, legal, and social benefits.28 	
Colombian economist Luis Jorge Garay, under the concept of Co-opted
State Reconfiguration, asserted that the action of legal and illegal organisations,
through illegitimate practices, seek to systematically modify from within the
political regime and influence the formation, modification, interpretation, and
application of the rules of the game and public policies. These practices are
undertaken with the purpose of obtaining sustained benefits and ensuring that
their interests are validated politically and legally, as well as gaining social
legitimacy in the long run, although these interests do not follow the founding
principle of social welfare”.29
The Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), which has been under
constant attack from the police, the attorney-general office, and parliament
members for the last couple of years, remains as one of the last rampant against
the impunity sought by state capturers. The Indonesian political party system
is characterised by a growing individualisation of weak leadership and by the
inability of political parties to identify the champion core of constituent groups
and to articulate policy programs.
The reality of Indonesia’s politics is that liberalised elections are extremely
costly for political parties. In a country with enormous and demographically
heterogeneous characteristics, winning elections requires both securing access
to financial resources, and strengthening the presence and visibility of political
parties at the local level to mobilise voters. Incumbent leaders clearly have a
competitive advantage on both fronts due to their influence on local budgets, their
ability to help businesses with close ties to political parties, and their ability to use
state resources to build strong support bases, particularly through the allocation
of social funds to mass organisations.30
In its press release, TII concluded that the financing of local elections is
the root of political corruption and state capture at the regional level. Besides
its direct impact on state resources, it raises more fundamental issues related to
political leadership, the strengthening of Indonesia’s political party system, and
public trust towards democracy.
Soekarno, the Founding Father of Indonesia had already addressed this
issue in BPUPKI on 1 June 1945, “We are building a Nation for all. Not for one
person, not for one class, not for aristocrats, nor for the rich, but for all.” This
cannot happen if the electoral process is rigged by money politics. One of the
biggest challenges associated with decentralisation is the risk of state capture
by the local elite.
With decentralisation, local elite and politicians suddenly gain
access to regional resources they can divert to benefit influential groups and
individuals whose money or votes count rather than the public at large. When
27
Money Politics and State Capture (2010). Transparency International Indonesia from http://
www.ti.or.id/en/index.php/press-release/2010/11/11/money-politics-and-state-capture
28
Ibid.
29
Ibid.
30
Ibid.
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civil participation in local government is low, as it seems to be the case in most
Indonesian provinces,31 there is a greater chance of interest groups and local
elite capturing and directing resources towards their own priorities rather than
towards poverty alleviation and improved service delivery.
2. Modes

There are several types of state capture in Indonesia: 32

Local networks of Patronage
Across the country,  the various powers of the state tend to be concentrated
in the village elites who usually maintain close and personal relations, increasing
the risks of collusion between key stakeholders to pursue vested interests. This
overlap of social and political functions and relations at the local level affects
public- and private-sector hiring practices, business relationships, and awarding
of contracts with widespread practices of nepotism and cronyism.
Red tape and bribe extortion
High level of bureaucracy provides multiple opportunities for rent-seeking
at sub national level, with involved public officials having large discretionary
powers as well as monopoly over these procedures. Bribes paid by firms mostly
arise from red tape, particularly in permits and licenses imposed by local
government officials. Research indicated that red tape and bribe extortion tend
to decrease in better funded localities and with increased education of local
officials.33

Lack of local capacity
Corruption risks are further increased by the lack of capacity of local
governments to manage increased responsibility and powers. Local governments
often lack the human and material resources to perform government duties in
a transparent and accountable manner as well as the operational and economic
capacity to run competitive and efficient public services.
Misuse of local public resources
In many local regions, levels of local corruption strongly affect the efficiency
of public spending on service delivery and the enactment of inconsistent local
regulations governing local budgets by national and regional parliaments. Those
can be magnified with the lack of local capacity to review budget documents
and to monitor budget formulation and execution. Such have opened many
opportunities for corruption and misuse of public resources.34  

Public procurement
Local procurement is another area especially vulnerable to corruption due
to the persistent culture of favours and patronage at the local level. As a result,

Chene. Loc. Cit.  
Ibid.
J. Vernon Henderson and Ari Kuncoro (2004). Corruption in Indonesia. Brown University from
http://www.pstc.brown.edu/henderson-kuncoro.pdf
34
Daniel Suryadarma (2008). Corruption, Public Spending, and Education Outcomes: Evidence
from Indonesia Research School of Social Sciences The Australian National University.
31
32
33
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local procurement offers many opportunities for corrupt practices, including
collusion of suppliers, bid-rigging, bribes and kickbacks, and favouritism in
contracts’ awarding.
Facilitation and other informal payments

Informal payments remain highly pervasive in the post Suharto era,
including payments to speed up the issuance of certificates, permits, and licenses
or to access public services that are supposed to be free of charge. Cutting across
all sectors of service delivery, there are also opportunities for extorting money
for so-called “services” such as school or hospital admissions, shoes or school
uniforms (that are sold by the teachers), private tutoring, or bribes for good
grades.
Lack of efficient controls and oversight mechanisms
In the urge to move away from the old autocratic regime, reforms failed
to establish effective monitoring and evaluation mechanisms that can hold local
governments accountable to the central government. Currently existing public
mechanisms have not proven to be the most effective to uncover corruption
cases in Indonesia. A World Bank study of 10 corruption cases in five Indonesian
provinces shows that almost without exception, all corruption cases had
been uncovered and reported by NGOs, community groups, social activists,
individual villagers, or affected parties rather than oversight, audit, or justice
institutions.35

Culture of impunity
Indonesia’s long tradition of authoritarian rule has left a legacy of
impunity for perpetrators of corruption, which combined with weak protection
of whistleblowers; This provides fertile ground for rent-seeking behaviours.
Sanctions have been rarely enforced, which tends to make corruption a lowcost and high-benefit activity, with little likelihood of redress. The traditional
hierarchical structure of local  villages also limits the propensity of citizens to
question those in power. In addition, at the village level, citizens appear to have
little awareness of their rights and entitlements, as well as of legal processes
and resources.36
Lesson Learned

Corruption is a political problem that will require strong political
commitment. It cannot be solely resolved with institutional reform. Additional
efforts and resources should be directed to strengthen political accountability.
Thus, by empowering civil society and constituency groups to demand
accountability, we can earn a public policy that does not benefit vested interests
at the expense of public interests and people’s welfare.
35
Taufik Rinaldi, Marini Purnomo and Dewi Damayanti (2007). Fighting Corruption in Decentralized
Indonesia Case Studies on Handling Local Government Corruption from  http://siteresources.worldbank.
org/INTINDONESIA/Resources/Publication/corruption_exec_sum_en.pdf  
36
Andrea Woodhouse (2005). Village Corruption in Indonesia Fighting Corruption in Indonesia’s
Kecamatan Development Program. Indonesian Social Development Paper No. 6.
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The international development community has an important role in  
supporting the development of a strong and critical civil society. Many countries
began transition as weak states unable to provide basic public goods and with
sets of powerful incumbent firms (these were predominantly state owned and
newly privatised) dominating their respective markets without having to resort
to bribery payments.
To compete in such an environment, new entrants adopted a strategy of
state capture to buy greater security for their property rights from public officials
and to encode, or incorporate, competitive advantages into the emerging legal and
regulatory framework. Thus, state capture became a strategy for a few firms to
create zones of relative
security and advantage
for themselves at the
expense of all other
firms.
In high-capture
economies, captor firms
grow more than twice
as fast as other firms. In
sharp contrast, captor
firms appear to enjoy
few advantages in lowcapture
economies,
where
such
grand
corruption looks more
like a survival strategy
for poorly performing
firms.37
Transparent governance reforms are therefore highly needed to better
share the power in the society, both horizontally and vertically, and to put
in place very clear conflict of interests rules. State institutions should have
safeguards to prevent them from being “owned” by specific individuals enjoying
a high discretionary power.38  
On the other hand, a vocal civil society, provided that basic civil liberties
are ensured, will point at governance deficiencies, call for better accountability,
and responsiveness from the side of the government. New incentives ought to
be found  to possibly instil a behaviour change in those actors.
International pressure or reward (such as joining the European Union)
can be a very powerful tool, as demonstrated in the case of the new EU member
states, which have undertaken major and rapid endeavours in the realm of
governance  to reach the goal of entering the EU.39
The efforts of firms to influence the legal, policy, and regulatory
environment wherein   they operate constitute a normal and indeed healthy
process that is common to all countries. What distinguishes such interactions
in the capture economy is exclusion. Some firms enjoy exclusive privileges
Hellman and Kaufmann. Loc. Cit.
Anne Lugon-Moulin. Loc. Cit.
39
Ibid.
37
38

No. 1 - Volume 2, May - August 2011

INDONESIA Law Review

~ 59 ~

to influence decisions of the state while others are systematically excluded,
enabling state officials to make choices that concentrate benefits on those with
access at a high cost to those who are excluded.
Although the general remedies for such problems—transparency and
competition—are, by now, increasingly acknowledged, the specific ways in which
reform of state capture can be achieved are less obvious. Mobilising the losers
in the capture economy—small and medium-sized enterprises, consumers, and
other interest groups—and enhancing their collective voice to counterbalance
the captors can have a catalytic effect in weakening the foundation of the capture
economy.40
An important reform instrument that is increasingly used by the more
competitive sectors, the disenfranchised, non-governmental organisations,
and others working to combat state capture is the power of data. Furthermore,
policies that encourage market entry, which might be overlooked by the existing
captors, are particularly important. Over time, more and more “smaller oligarchs”
may emerge to compete for influence and dissipate the rents for state capture.
1. Corruption As Crime

“The cartels have not yet corrupted the government’s senior levels, but
sooner or later they will, because they have millions of dollars and you need to be
a saint to reject them.”41 Since time, both legitimate and illegitimate businesses
have been attempting to distort or displace the state for its own gain. In many
contexts, organised criminal groups have become major contenders in these
efforts, engaging significantly at the intellectual, political, and institutional level
with state and social actors.
Until recently, organised criminal activity was constrained within a state’s
borders or limited to a small number of global cartels and mafia groups. However,
the end of Communism coupled with the expansion of global markets and the
rising sophistication of information communications technology have spurred
mass expansion of organised crime.
In the course of expanding their operations, transnational organised
crime groups and networks have sought to gradually weaken, co-opt, disable,
privatise, or usurp the functions of governmental agencies, political and judicial
institutions, and the state itself. In contrast to other illicit means of interaction
with the state such as ‘influence’ or ‘administrative corruption,’ organised
criminal groups often seek to “prevent the law from being enforced altogether”
leading to, or further ensconcing a culture of impunity.
In many states across the globe, politicians and public officials are perceived
(and have often been found to be) as part of illicit, elite, and corrupt networks.
Over time, this has resulted in increasing public mistrust of parliamentarians,
public servants, and state institutions, often leading to a waning respect for
authority and the rule of law, and decreased institutional legitimacy.
Despite the vast body of literature on these issues and the huge sums of
money invested in developing policy and operational responses to meet the
challenges that organised criminals and corrupt politicians and other state
actors pose, significant challenges remain.
Hellman and Kaufmann. Loc. Cit.
Center on International Cooperation (2011). Seminar on Organized Crime and State Capture,
Meeting Report. New York University from http://www.cic.nyu.edu/peacebuilding/docs/Lima%20Semin
ar%20Background%20Paper.pdf
40
41
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During the 1990s, law enforcement agencies in Europe developed a
number of operational definitions of the phrase “organised criminal group.”
Those definitions agree on the following crucial elements: such a group is
structured, has some permanence, commits serious crimes for profit, uses
violence, has corrupt officials, launders criminal proceeds, and reinvests in the
licit economy.42
While state capture is often practiced by private actors, it also can be
practiced by people within the government, in alliance with private actors or
not. Illicit political finance facilitates corruption and other means of effectively
privatising – through bribes, intimidation, and violence – vital state functions,
federal and local agencies, members of parliament, political parties, key
government actors, local governments, and state territory.43
State capture aims at systematically distorting or displacing the state
through a clandestine parallel entity or entities, and may be classified as the
most pernicious manifestation of political corruption. State capture is to be
distinguished from petty corruption; it is manifested as meta-corruption, or
grand corruption, in which illicit political finance is used to systematically
control public institutions.
While the phenomenon of state capture also takes place within nondemocratic governments, it can be argued that, except in rare cases, non-democratic
governments are examples of comprehensive state capture, whether by clans,
organised crime networks, armies, militias, liberation movements, oligarchs,
multinational corporations, foreign governments, or a combination thereof.
Crime and corruption do not always co-exist, share the same determinants,
or respond to the same strategies and measures. A corrupt and authoritarian
police state can control common crime, as in North Korea. Conversely, common
crime can be a challenge to countries with satisfactory anti-corruption track
records, like Chile.44
Crime rates tend to be higher where there is high unemployment,
high socio-economic inequality, and lax gun laws. Corruption thrives where
civil liberties, free press, transparency, and contestable politics are absent.
Functioning rule-of-law matters for controlling both crime and corruption; but
again differences emerge: an independent judiciary is crucial for combating
political corruption and an effective police is important for fighting petty
corruption as well as common crime.
There are also differences between the determinants of common and
organised crime, since the latter does relate to corruption more closely—for
instance, drug traffickers and underground arms dealers thrive in collusion
with corrupt authorities in weak states. Unfortunately, most of the research on
corruption focuses on developing countries. When corruption indices measure
cruder forms of corruption, such as bribery, they mask one of the most serious
governance challenges facing countries like the United States today—so-called
legal corruption and state capture by powerful corporations.
42
Edgardo Buscaglia and Jan van Dijk (2003). Controlling Organized Crime and Corruption in
the Public Sector. Forum on Crime and Society Vol 3 No. 1 and 2 from http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/
forum/forum3_Art1.pdf
43
David Kupferschmidt (2009). Illicit Political Finance and State Capture. International IDEA from
http://www.idea.int/resources/analysis/upload/IDEA_Inlaga_low.pdf
44
Daniel Kaufmann (2010), Breaking the Cycle of Crime and Corruption? Brookings from http://
www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/0414_corruption_crime_kaufmann.aspx
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The strategies to combat different manifestations of crime and corruption
will differ from each other, and must be tailored to country context. To combat
common crime, it is important to focus on shared socio-economic progress and
reduced unemployment among the youth, police effectiveness, and effectivegun
banamong civilians. To address legal corruption and state capture, reforms in
transparency, as well as restrictions on corporate political finance and lobbying
is needed.
Yet crime and corruption do share important aspects in common. To be
prepared to take on powerful vested interests and to address the challenges
of money in politics, political will, leadership, and integrity are required at
the top. Some examples of strategic uses of illicit political finance used toward
state capture are cursorily outlined in the following, as yet crude and tentative,
table.45
Country/
region

Alleged agent(s) of
state capture

Primacy source(s) of
illicit political finance

Primary institutional
targets

Territorial expression
of state capture

Afghanistan

‘Warlords’

Poppies, heroin

Politicians, army, border
control

Regional

The state

National

border

remote areas

Bulgaria

Burma

Colombia

Guatemala
GuineaBissau

‘Organised crime’
consisting of former
and
current state security
agents
Army

Drug cartels,
guerrillas (ELN,

FARC), Paramilitary
Organisations

Elements of the Army
and
former secret services
Drug traffickers

High-conflict

Armies (domestic and

Sub-Saharan

(domestic and foreign),

countries in
Africa
Italy

Kosovo
Pakistan

foreign), ‘rebel groups’
foreign corporations
exploiting natural
resources

‘Organised crime’
groups
originating in southern
Italy

Organised crime with
the participation of
some
KLA members
Inter-Services
Intelligence (ISI)

Peru
Vladimiro Lenin
1990–2000
Montesinos,Loc.
HeadCit.
of
45
Kupferschmidt.
Peru’s Intelligence
Service
‘Oligarchs’ colluding

and
No. Russia
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2,with
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FSU

high state officials,
many
of whom came from the
security services

Opaquely-privatised
industries, trafficking
±(of women), taxes
Drugs, industries
controlled by army
Drugs

Cocaine
Cocaine, foreign aid

Key institutions: customs,
judiciary, media, etc.

Legislature, political
parties, judiciary, police,
Institutions that might
impinge on or facilitate
trafficking

National

Local control, with FARC
increasingly pushed into
National

Institutions that might
impinge on or facilitate
drug trafficking

National

Drugs, extortion,

Political, judicial, some

Regional control and

Trafficking (weapons,
women, heroin)

Institutions that might
impinge on or facilitate

Heroin, guns, the state

All institutions

Natural resources,
foreign
aid

counterfeit
merchandise,
state contracts

Cocaine, weapons,
embezzlement,
procurement30

media, police

trafficking

Tax authority, judiciary,
military, military
intelligence, media

Regional

penetration of national
institutions
National
National
National

Opaquely-privatised
economic, political,
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Kosovo

Country/
region
Afghanistan
Pakistan
Bulgaria
Peru
1990–2000
Russia and
Burma
FSU
Colombia

Guatemala
United States
GuineaBissau

foreign corporations
exploiting natural
resources

‘Organised crime’
groups
originating in southern
Italy

Organised crime with
the
participation
Alleged
agent(s)ofof
some
state capture
KLA members
‘Warlords’
Inter-Services
Intelligence (ISI)
‘Organised crime’
Vladimiro Lenin
consisting of former
Montesinos, Head of
and
Peru’s Intelligence
current state security
Service
agents
‘Oligarchs’ colluding
with
Army
high state officials,
many
Drug
cartels,
of
whom
came from the
guerrillas (ELN,
security services
FARC), Paramilitary
Organisations
Elements of the Army
Corporations
and
former secret services
Drug traffickers

Drugs, extortion,

Political, judicial, some

Trafficking (weapons,
women,
Primacyheroin)
source(s) of

Institutions that might
impinge
or facilitate
Primaryon
institutional

counterfeit
merchandise,
state contracts

illicit political finance
Poppies, heroin
Heroin, guns, the state
Opaquely-privatised
Cocaine, weapons,
industries, trafficking
embezzlement,
procurement
±(of women),30taxes

Opaquely-privatised
Drugs, industries
industries
natural
controlled and
by army
Drugs
resources
(oil, gas),
state
contracts, taxes
Cocaine
Legal
profits
Cocaine, foreign aid

2. Strategy For Combating Corruption

Regional control and

media, police

penetration of national

targets
trafficking
Politicians,
army, border
All institutions
control

Key institutions: customs,
Tax authority, judiciary,
judiciary, media, etc.
military, military
intelligence, media

institutions
National

Territorial expression
of state capture
Regional
National
National
National

Most economic, political,
The state
judicial and security

Regional and
National
international, but in

Institutions
that might
Agencies regulating
impinge on
or facilitate
relevant
industry
trafficking

National
None

Legislature,
political
organs,
including
political
parties, judiciary, police,
parties and media
border

Localascontrol,
withto
FARC
flux
state seeks
increasingly pushed into
subordinate or
remote areas
expropriate
some oligarchs

Institutions that might
impinge on or facilitate
drug trafficking

National

Institutions that might

National

judicial and security

international, but in

Natural resources,
Armies (domestic
and for combating corruption has traditionally
Regional
The standard
advice
focused
foreign
in
foreign),
groups’
aid
on countries
measures
to ‘rebel
address
administrative
corruption by reforming public
Sub-Saharan
(domestic
administration
andand foreign),
public finance management. But with the increasing
Africa
foreignthe
corporations
recognition
that
roots of corruption extend far beyond weaknesses in the
exploiting natural
capacity of government,
the repertoire has been gradually expanding to target
resources
broader structural
relationships, including the internal organisation of the
‘Organised crime’
Italy
Drugs, extortion,
Political, judicial, some
Regional control and
political
system,
groups relationships among core state institutions, the interactions
originating in southern
counterfeit
media, police
penetration of national
between the state and firms,merchandise,
and the relationship between the
state and civil
46
Italy
state contracts
institutions
society.
High-conflict

Kosovo

Organised crime with

Trafficking (weapons,

the participation
of
women, heroin)
impinge on or facilitate
Increasing political
accountability:
some
KLA
members
As political accountability increases, trafficking
the costs to politicians of making
Pakistan that
Inter-Services
Heroin, guns,
the state
All the
institutions
National
decisions
benefit their private
interests
at
expense of the
broader public
(ISI)
interest also Intelligence
increase.
Two of the key instruments for strengthening political
Peru
Vladimiro Lenin
Cocaine, weapons,
Tax authority, judiciary,
accountability
are: (i) increasing
the transparency
of decisionsNational
made by public
1990–2000
Montesinos, Head of
embezzlement,
military, military
officials and Peru’s
(ii)Intelligence
increasing procurement
competition through
that provide
intelligence,organisations
media
Service
broad constituencies
with vehicles, such as mass-based political parties, for
‘Oligarchs’ colluding
Russia and their collective demands.
Opaquely-privatised
Most economic, political,
Regional and
expressing
with
30

FSU

high state officials,

industries and natural

many
Strengthening
institutional restraints within the
state:
of whom came from the resources (oil, gas),
organs, including political
flux as state seeks to
stateof the state can be an important mechanism in
The institutional
design
security services
contracts, taxes
parties and media
subordinate or
checking corruption, particularly, the effective separation ofexpropriate
powers among
some oligarchs
state entities with each operating as a check on the abuse of power
by the others.
United States Corporations
profits
Agencies
regulating
Strengthening
and raising theLegal
credibility
of the
judicial
system None
by enhancing the
relevant industry
independence and accountability of judges and matching functions with budget
and capacity are particularly important.
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The World Bank (2000). Anticorruption in Transition A Contribution to the Policy Debate from
http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/17506/contribution.pdf

No. 1 - Volume 2, May - August 2011

INDONESIA Law Review

~ 63 ~

Strengthening civil society participation:
As stakeholders in the quality of governance and as intermediaries
for communication between the populace and the institutions of state, the
organisations that comprise civil society can be essential in constraining
corruption. Recently, there has been an emergence of greater civil society activism
regarding corruption throughout the region, focused especially on: creating
public awareness about corruption and the need to control it, formulating action
plans to fight corruption, and monitoring government behaviour.
Fostering an independent media:

Free and open media help check the level of corruption by uncovering
and shedding light on abuses. Yet the promise of a free press has not yet been
fully realised in many transition countries. A policy of openness, formalised in
laws guaranteeing free access to information, strengthens tools for oversight
and enlists the media as an ally in controlling corruption.
Creating a competitive private sector:

A state is most vulnerable to capture when economic power is concentrated
in a few firms or industries and when competing economic interests lack viable
access to the policymaking process. The ability of powerful economic interests
to capture the state can be checked by reducing the benefits to these firms from
capture. This can be achieved in part by deepening price and trade liberalisation,
increasing transparency in the ownership structure and operations of firms, and
introducing greater competition in concentrated sectors by lowering barriers to
entry and requiring competitive restructuring.
Reforming public sector management:

While strengthening mechanisms of external accountability is important,
it is also essential to strengthen the internal management of public resources
and administration to reduce opportunities and incentives for corruption. This
requires instilling meritocracy and adequate pay in public administration.
In combating corruption an anti-corruption strategy is needed:

Credible political leadership:
A serious anticorruption program cannot be imposed from the outside,
but requires committed leadership from within, ideally from the highest levels
of the state.
Diagnosing the nature and extent of the problem in each case:
Implementing surveys, running workshops, and developing a dialogue
with institutions of civil society on corruption are all critical for gaining countryspecific knowledge beyond the narrow limits of the typology.
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Assessing the environment:
The relevance and feasibility of specific reform instruments is closely
linked to the way in which power is exercised, the level of informality in the
society, and the extent to which people feel trust in their institutions and in each
other.

Finding appropriate entry points:
It is critical to begin at a point where the goals are feasible and tangible
results can be realised within a time frame that builds support for further
reforms.

Maximising leverage:
Efforts should be made to design “win-win” anticorruption strategies that
promote the interests and reputations of major politicians and businesspeople
while delivering positive externalities such as enhancing economic growth,
strengthening governance, or reducing poverty and inequality.
Based on some researches by the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (EBRD)  there is no close correlation between changes in levels
of capture and the introduction of high-profile anti-corruption programmes.
The same can be said for administrative corruption. However,  anti-corruption
programmes may take a while to have an impact and  time series and overall
number of observations in the transition region can be  too limited to reach any
firm conclusion.47
While the paradigm presented by Hellman and Kaufmann---of the actions
of individuals, groups, or firms both in the public and private sectors to influence
the formation of laws, regulations, decrees, and other government policies to
their own advantage as a result of the illicit and non-transparent provision
of private benefits to public officials---certainly has validity in defining the
behaviour of political/economic actors in many countries of the world, it does
require a degree of refinement if it is to be applied to the entire Former Soviet
Union (FSU) region.
While there exists rampant corruption in the countries of the FSU and
oligarchs in many countries have seized the lion’s shares of State assets, the
question arises as to who is capturing who. Is it a case of the State being captured
by the private sector or a fusion of the State and the private sector? Putin
already put it in quite a definite statement, “I only want to draw your attention
straightaway to the fact that you have yourselves formed this very state, to a large
extent through political and quasi-political structures under your control. So
perhaps what one should do least of all is blame the mirror.”48
For Indonesia, the data released by TII is very intriguing:49  

Decrease in state support to political parties
In 75 per cent of all liberal democracies in the world, the state provides
financial assistance to political parties, with no significant differences between
Bowser. Loc. Cit.
Vladimir Putin, in a meeting with Russia’s business leaders in July 2000 (Hoffman, 2000). from
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2001/09/hellman.htm
49
TII. Loc. Cit.
47
48
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old and new democracies. India, Switzerland, New Zealand and the United States
are the only liberal democracies which do not allocate public funds for political
parties. However, even in some of these countries, state support is available for
individual candidates.

Increasing electoral costs
Before 2004, political parties had to finance only one parliamentary
campaign every five years, with executive officials elected afterwards by their
respective legislatures. After the post-2004 reforms, which introduced direct
elections for the presidency, governorships, and district head positions, the
number of popular ballots in any one district in a five-year cycle rose to a
minimum of four and a maximum of seven.

Impact on state budgets: development of ‘indirect state subsidies
Following the implementation of the regulation in 2005, the share of per
diems and other allowances in public budgets skyrocketed, with an increase of
more than 80per cent for Parliament Members.
Surge in political corruption
150 gents and mayors and 17 governors have been jailed since 2005.

Capture of political parties’ leadership by wealthy candidates : disruption of
leadership and weakening of political lines of demarcations
In the 2005 local elections, party affiliation has played only a very
marginal role in the nomination process. Although parties had the exclusive
right to nominate candidates, with independents barred from running, only 22
per cent of all nominees were party officials. The large majority was bureaucrats
and entrepreneurs, with 36 and 28 per cent representation, respectively; 39.8
per cent of all members of the 2004-2009 national parliaments were businesspeople.
Conclusion

Power corrupts  absolutely. To address Lord Acton (1952) after a century
seems fit to this matter. “It is easier to find people fit to govern themselves than
people to govern others. Every man is the best, the most responsible, judge of his
own advantage.”50  
Illicit aspects of governance may appear difficult to assess, as they are by
nature clandestine. However, this dark side of public life is not unknowable, and
various scholars, particularly economists, are making inroads into describing
and measuring these phenomena. The World Bank and others are currently
attempting to analyse the conditions and processes by which state capture
occurs, and to measure its extent.
Kaufmann whowas the first to research about state capture already
explained that in some developing countries such as Indonesiathis type of
corruption may not be referred to as state capture. Nonetheless the significant
parties in the country that are involved in these matters already address the
50
Lord Acton, as quoted by Himmelfarb in her work, Lord Acton, 1952 (University of Chicago Press,
1960) pp 172-3.  from http://blupete.com/Literature/Biographies/Philosophy/Acton.htm
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issue. Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW) and Transparency International
Indonesia (TII) are some of them.
In analysing political financing regulations, TII addresses that such
practices could actually be prevented to a larger extent if political parties were
required to provide standardised financial reports in facilitating the audit of
public accountants. This can go in three ways, as follows: first, by amending
the law on general elections to challenge the Constitutional Court’s decision;
second, by limiting the donations of party members; and last, by revising the law
on political parties to generalise reporting obligations in terms of corporate and
individual donations outside the campaign period.
This writing is merely a contribution to the research at large.   Due to
the global form of corruption, every means is necessary. Hopefully, this piece
can shed some light into the growing policy dialogue on developing practical
strategies for reducing corruption. As more and more countries seek to
implement anticorruption programs, it is critical for the other institutions to
continue to enhance this dialogue with both the lessons of experience and the
new approaches designed to tackle the roots of corruption.
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